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Its Elementary 
   
Its elementary dear Watson; e-mail, instant messaging, electronic documents, and 
databases, no longer does Sherlock Holmes carry only a magnifying glass, his 21
st 
century tool kit includes a write blocker and bit stream backup software. The nature of 
evidence has changed. Thousands of incriminating documents can be on a memory card 
the size of a penny. This latent evidence will take the science of computer forensics to 
discover it. Ask Doctor Watson what the best way to collect electronic evidence is, and 
he will not know the answer. This one would expect, the problem comes from the fact 
that neither does Mr. Holmes or today’s forensic investigators for that matter. The 
science of computer forensics has had a brief history, only recently has it moved out of 
the government and military worlds and in to corporate America (Carrier, 2002). Mr. 
Holmes may find the evidence and the crook, but will his case and evidence get through 
the courts?  
In the new science of computer forensics, the way he found his “smoking gun,” 
may not meet the requirements of admissible evidence in the United States judicial 
system. In the past there have not been a significant number of serious legal challenges to 
computer evidence in court. Cases such as Gates v. Bando (1996), where evidence 
collection methods clearly destroyed evidence, demonstrate that proper tools and 
methods are necessary for courts to accept evidence (Smith, 2002).  Conversely, peer 
reviewed and documented evidence collection has been accepted in state courts, as in the 
case of State v. Cook (2002) from the appeals court of Ohio. For the most part the courts 
have been willing to accept the testimony and evidence presented by individuals with a 
significant understanding of computer systems.      Marsico 4 
The computer forensic community is constantly changing, new technologies and 
methods are common and changes are happening at a rapid pace. What is common 
procedure today may not be common procedure tomorrow. How will a court system put 
faith in the expertise of individuals and the evidence they collect, when the best practice 
for this collection changes so rapidly? These issues are discussed in this paper which will 
present a snapshot of the computer forensic community as it is today, and offer guidance 
on where the community needs to go to meet the goal of becoming a more mature 
scientific discipline. 
A Brief History of Scientific Evidence 
 
  In 1993 the United States Supreme Court made a landmark ruling that would 
change the way scientific evidence was presented in the court room. The ruling was 
based on the belief that the rules for presentation of scientific evidence needed to be 
updated. This ruling was in the case of Daubert v. Merrell (1993).  Before a decision in 
this case could have ever been made there had to be a set of events that lead to the ruling. 
Two key steps in the development of rules for the admissibility of scientific evidence are 
Frye and the Federal Rules of Evidence. An understanding of these is critical to the 
discussion of computer forensics and the Daubert criteria.  
Frye 
 
Since 1923 courts in the United States have relied on the “general acceptance” 
test to determine if evidence was legitimate. This test was based on the ruling in the case 
of Frye v. United States (1923) by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. This test 
set the standard that if a scientific practice was generally accepted amongst the scientific     Marsico 5 
community that it was practiced in, it could be admitted in court. This standard came 
when the court refused to admit evidence from a device similar to a lie detector test 
(Bernstein, 2001). The court in its ruling stated that; 
 “While courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced 
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from 
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”  
(Frye v. US, 1923) 
“General acceptance” would be used for many years by federal and state courts. Today 
the test is still used for admission of scientific evidence in several state judicial systems 
(O’Connor, 2004). 
The Frye test only applied to true scientific evidence and was used mostly in 
criminal cases (Bernstein, 2001). Frye was a landmark case and the rule showed the 
court’s power to make judgment on what should be evidence. These novel scientific 
procedures, that are the target of Frye, are often referred to as “Junk Science” (NTI, 
2004). Evidence from “junk science” is what the “general acceptance” test was designed 
to remove from court. Bernstein (2001) states that even though Frye was not often 
referenced in cases involving scientific evidence many of the courts were simply using 
“general acceptance” without citing Frye. The author also believes that the Frye test was 
often considered inapplicable in civil cases. The United States with its “general 
acceptance” test as the guideline for submission of scientific evidence would experience a 
dramatic change a little more then fifty years later. 
FRE 
   
In 1975 the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) took effect using standards that had 
been developed by the United States Supreme Court just a few years earlier. The FRE     Marsico 6 
now governed the admissibility of evidence into the federal court room. In the discussion 
of scientific evidence one of the most important rules is #702. This rule, which was 
recently amended in 2000, states: 
“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if 
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony 
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” 
 
It was developed for the determination of a witnesses’ ability to be considered an expert. 
This rule sets a list of key requirements that the witness must meet in order to be 
considered an expert: sufficient facts, reliable methods, and proper application. One of 
the complaints with Frye was that the ruling was vague (Bernstein, 2002). The FRE 
countered this ambiguity with specific requirements. 
Along came Daubert 
 
In 1993 the United States Supreme Court ruled on a decision involving the case of 
William Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. The plaintiff was suing for birth 
defects allegedly caused by the medicine Benedictine. Daubert had eight different 
scientific witnesses all testify that the medicine could cause birth defects. The court 
decided that this evidence was not admissible. The ruling was based on the fact that the 
court felt these witnesses did not meet the standards set by the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
They decided that the “general acceptance” test that was outlined in the Frye case had 
now been superceded by the FRE (Bernstein, 2001). The court went on to state; “thus 
general acceptance is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of evidence under 
the FRE” (Daubert v. Merrell, 1993). The Supreme Court was saying that lawmakers     Marsico 7 
purposefully left out information regarding general acceptance so the judge would act as 
a “gatekeeper” and make a determination on the scientific testimony’s reliability 
(Bernstein, 2001). 
  This “gatekeeper” rule extended the powers of the judge in cases with scientific 
evidence. Now before a trial, a judge may rule on the admissibility of the scientific 
evidence, not simply the credibility of the witness. The witness’ requirements for 
credibility are outlined in Rule #702 of the FRE but the guidelines for a judge to rule on 
the credibility of the actual evidence is not. The judge has the burden of determining if 
the evidence is both relevant and reliable (Carrier, 2002). This is a shift of power from 
the Frye test, where it was the scientific community that had to show that the science was 
true based on its acceptability to the community (Rogers, 2003). The “Daubert Test” has 
short comings when there is no scientific community around the science (Carrier, 2002).  
  With judges empowered to make credibility decisions, a hearing called a 
“Daubert Hearing” may occur before a trail (Smith, 2002). In this hearing each side has 
the opportunity to present that the science behind the evidence they wish to admit is 
valid. According to interpretations of the Daubert (1993) ruling, the admissibility of 
scientific evidence should be considered on the following four criteria. 
•  Has the theory or technique been reliably tested? 
•  Has the theory or technique been subject to peer review? 
•  What are the theories or techniques known or potential error rates? 
•  Has the theory or technique been generally accepted as a standard in its 
scientific community? 
(O’Connor, 2004) 
 
The court later went on to clarify with an opinion in Joiner (1997) that these 
criteria apply to the methodology and principals, not the conclusions drawn from the 
technique (Benstein, 2001).       Marsico 8 
The criteria were not specifically outlined to only cover scientific evidence. The 
case Kumho Tire v. Carmichael (1999) furthered the scope of the Daubert requirements 
to cover technology expertise. This ruling set the precedent that the four rules described 
above would be used to measure the methodology of engineers and technologists when 
ascertaining the admissibility of their “technological” evidence.  This extension of the 
Daubert requirements is another way computer forensics falls under the criteria.  
Computer forensics is difficult to classify as a disciple.  It would appear that computer 
forensics itself is a science at the purest level. Investigators then use technologies to 
exercise the scientific principles to collect evidence. The Daubert criteria are applicable 
to computer forensics from both avenues. 
The ruling in the Daubert case was intended to end the “battle of experts” 
(O’Conner, 2004). O’Conner states that: 
“Scientific fields that have been generally accepted by the professional forensic 
associations are proliferating, forensic this and forensic that; there must be some 
underlying reliability standards.”  
This statement leads well into the discussion of the field of computer forensics. How is 
the computer forensic community building a foundation of “reliability standards?” 
Today’s Computer Forensic Community 
   
According to Rogers (2003), the area of computer forensic is “at a cross roads in 
its journey to become a recognized scientific discipline.” This illustrates the fact that 
computer forensics is currently an immature scientific discipline. The community is 
missing some of the key elements that would make it mature. As shown, the Daubert 
criteria have been made the guidelines for technology, science and engineering to be     Marsico 9 
admissible. Does the field currently meet the requirements? In looking at each of the four 
criteria the discipline can be adjudicated on its compliance.  
Testing 
   
Testing of scientific tools according to Daubert is an important step in the 
maturation of a science. In order for evidence to be proven reliable, the tools used in its 
production should be tested to make sure that the results they report are accurate and 
uniform. This testing guideline subjects a tool to a battering of situations to insure 
accurate results (Carrier, 2002).  
In the field of computer forensics there are two main types of tools; hardware and 
software. The hardware tools are mainly write blockers or other devices that interface 
with computer components. These can be easily tested to show they operate properly. It is 
more difficult with software tools. In Carrier’s “Open Source Digital Forensics Tools: 
The Legal Argument” (2002) two types of software are discussed; open and closed 
source. Where does reliability testing on these types of software come from? For closed 
source software many times a forensic investigator and the courts must trust the vendor 
that the software was created accurately. These groups must also trust that the vendor has 
properly coded the software so that the results obtained from its application are reliable. 
Closed source testing can be done by the public, but only the vendor has access to the 
code, so only they can vouch for the accuracy of the underling process (Carrier, 2002). 
With an open source software tool one must also rely on the group or organization 
producing the software, but having access to the software’s source code increases ones’ 
ability to verify the integrity of the software and its results.     Marsico 10 
  The National Instate of Standards and Technology (NIST) through the US 
Department of Commerce has a working group on Computer Forensic Tool Testing 
(CFTT). This group works to define requirements for disk imaging tools used in 
computer forensics (NIST, 2001). NIST reports that dependable computer forensics tools 
are required for reliable means of investigating crimes. It is important that the tools used 
are tested to make certain that the information they produce is accurate. This project is an 
important step for the forensic community but the testing is limited to tools that copy or 
image hard disk drives. Imaging hard disk drives is only one aspect of the forensic 
process, so this is only a part of what is needed. 
Peer Review 
   
The requirement of peer review under Daubert is a continuation from the Frye.  
Under Frye this was the main requirement for admissibility (Carrier 2002). With Daubert 
it is necessary that the methods and tools pass public and expert scrutiny before being 
considered admissible. The peer review process has long been used in the scientific 
community to facilitate this requirement and most of the publication and review comes 
from professional journals. These journals offer a researcher the ability to collaborate 
with peers and open research up to scrutiny, retesting, and analysis. 
Steps have been taken in the area of peer review. Several journals have been 
created that have gained popularity in the computer forensic community. These journals 
are all in the first few volumes and most have not gained wide acceptance or readership 
outside of the community. This will change over time and the journals that are in 
existence are a step in the right direction.      Marsico 11 
A problem with the peer review system is that reviews must be done by experts. 
Currently, there is no one way for a computer forensic expert to be defined. The journals 
are created by academic institutions, companies and media outlets. They look to persons 
with extensive training and background to be considered experts. It is difficult to rely on 
the expertise of the individuals that are reviewing the published material when there is no 
common understanding of what makes one an expert. 
Error Rates 
 
The courts cite error rates as import for admissibility because truth is an import 
aspect of the United States legal system. The truth can only be found when no error is 
made in the collection, analysis, or presentation of evidence. With known error rates for 
the technologies used, the court can make a determination on the likelihood of a believed 
truth being false. If justice is blind then known error rates in the most import aspect of the 
Daubert test because justice will blindly follow evidence presented as truth. 
To determine error rates requires extensive testing. This testing must be done not 
only on the tools used to create the evidence but also on the methodologies used. The 
community currently has done little in the way of determination of error rates. Testing 
must be done on all the tools used to create evidence. Vendors with proprietary 
information must be willing to share the results of error tests conducted or open their 
software up to outside scrutiny. Once extensive error testing has been done, a total 
possibility of error will be able to be determined from the known error rates of the tools 
chosen to gather the latent forensic evidence. 
The many competing methods or “best practices” of computer forensic evidence 
collection need to be evaluated. There are currently several methods to accomplish the     Marsico 12 
same goal of collection. In order for a method to be accepted the potential error rates of 
the method, including where mistakes can be made and the possible error associated with 
those mistakes should be determined. After this the federal justice system will be able to 
make an educated decision on admissibility of evidence collected using the method. 
Standards/Acceptance 
 
  Standards and acceptance are important because evidence needs to be of the 
highest quality. The scientific community that the evidence is coming from needs to be in 
agreement that the evidence was created in a standard and acceptable way. This has 
previously been accomplished by peer review and certification of methods and practices. 
As mentioned, there are several methods widely used to collect latent computer 
evidence. Many institutions and organizations have released their own methodologies to 
collect evidence. These “best practices” while created with the best intentions have 
caused a problem because of some of their differences. The court does not have a true 
universally accepted method to rely upon. To further complicate the problem, many self-
proclaimed computer forensics experts take what they feel are the best aspects of several 
approaches and create their own methodology. This proprietary method is kept secret and 
regarded as intellectual property. 
The variety of methods has caused the problem of lack of universal acceptance. 
With each organization championing their method, a consensus approach can not be 
reached and no practice is considered standard.     Marsico 13 
The Battle: Computer Forensics v. Daubert 
   
 Where does the field of computer forensics fit today into the world of Daubert? It 
is certain that much work has yet to be done in the field, yet court cases that involve 
computer evidence go on daily. Are the courts not looking at the science and technology 
and comparing it to the Daubert criteria? Are lawyers not challenging the evidence 
presented? Both of these may be the case. It has been mentioned by several computer 
forensics “experts” that the reason these changes have not occurred is because much of 
the trial work that is coming in contact with computer forensic technologies is in civil 
courts. When it is not a matter of life and death most of the lawyers don’t feel a need to 
challenge the evidence (R. Hendricks, personal interview, March 3, 2004). This type of 
challenge takes time and money. Hendricks went on to say that once computer evidence 
begins to make the move more to the criminal court room, especially in matters of capital 
crimes, there will be more challenges to the validity of the evidence.  
  So is the legal profession ready to challenge the admissibility of computer 
forensic evidence? Scott Ksander, computer forensics “expert” for the Purdue University 
police department says that most lawyers aren’t prepared to understand the science 
behind the technology (Ksander, 2004). They take the testimony of the experts at face 
value and at most gather up their own expert. With this the jury and court are faced with 
the “dueling geeks” predicament. One expert says one thing while the other expert refutes 
those findings and presents different findings. In these cases who is the jury to believe? 
This type of situation is exactly what the Daubert rulings are supposed to have 
eliminated. Then why are these situations still occurring? Possibly the short comings of 
computer forensic science provides no grounds for the judge to rule on admissibility.     Marsico 14 
Without a “gold standard” in the field (Rogers, 2003) for training or methodology, how is 
a judge with little or no computer background able to rule if the method used is 
acceptable under Daubert criteria.   
Why haven’t more cases been forced to a Daubert hearing? Referring back to the 
thoughts of Rebecca Hendricks, these aren’t life and death matters. Also many judges 
believe that the FRE rule #702 and the “gatekeeper” rules of Daubert should be applied 
liberally, and the court should use the rule when it feels it fits justice or the sprit of the 
law (Pfaffenbach, 2001).  The US legal system is based on interpretation of law. When a 
judge believes that the criteria do not apply, they often will not enforce them. Another 
reason may be that 95% of cases that enter the United States legal system never make it 
to court (Cambanis, 2004). These are decided in a plea bargain or settlement. It is 
Ksander’s (2004) experience that most defendants, upon hearing evidence that links them 
to the crime was collected from their computer, take a plea bargain or confess. 
  Many of these problems are discussed in the New Technologies Inc. (NTI) 
document; “Defending Against Junk Science Attacks” by Anderson (2003).  NTI offers 
solutions to Daubert challenges. Their recommendations include expert training from 
several different sources and collection of evidence with multiple tools (Anderson, 2003). 
NTI’s recommendations show that in computer forensics there is no one best method of 
collecting evidence and no standard in accreditation of experts. Their recommendation to 
use several tools proves that there are no good published error rates, so evidence 
collection using one tool with little known error is not possible. Also there are a large 
number of tools to choose from, with no uniform best practice. These recommendations 
show first had the necessary steps the community must take.      Marsico 15 
Its time to grow up 
 
When Rogers (2003) speaks of the “cross roads” he is talking about the next steps 
or the direction that the field must go for it to be accepted. The steps a field must take to 
become mature are not a standard path. The field of DNA testing has gone through the 
same processes that computer forensics is now facing. Computer forensics can use the 
knowledge gained from the DNA evidence maturation process as a roadmap for its own 
development. In 1996 Conners and others outlined some key goals that the DNA 
community must strive for; 
 
  Among the tasks ahead are the following: maintaining  
  the highest standards for the collection and preservation  
of DNA evidence; ensuring that the DNA testing 
  methodology meets rigorous scientific criteria for 
  reliability and accuracy; and ensuring proficiency 
  and credibility of forensic scientists so that their  
  results and testimony are of the highest caliber  
  and are capable of withstanding exacting scrutiny. 
 
  Meeting these scientific challenges requires 
  continued support for research that contributes to 
  the advancement of the forensic sciences. The 
  research agenda must also enable criminal justice 
  practitioners to understand and to make appropriate 
  use of the rapidly advancing and increasingly 
  available technology. 
                  (Conners, 1996) 
 
These goals for the DNA community are the same that are now necessary for computer 
forensics to become a decisive science.  
The field must be willing to unify behind a common methodology of collection. 
This method does not have to be set it stone, it can evolve with time as technologies and 
tools change. A standard does need to be established and certified by the justice system. 
A negative effect of this may be similar to what happened in the world of DNA evidence,     Marsico 16 
once a standard was chosen, many previous cases that had been decided on by what now 
would be considered an incorrect scientific method were overturned in an appeal. 
Additionally many innocent individuals who were convicted were able to prove their 
innocence through the use of the DNA (Conners, 1996). Yet until a standard is chosen the 
situation described will never occur and the problem will always exist.  
Another reason a standard must be chosen is so the courts and law enforcement 
don’t face similar problems to that which recently occurred in the fingerprinting 
community. The judge in the case United States v. Plaza (2002) ruled that the evidence of 
fingerprints in the case came from a “junk science” and that witnesses could not offer 
expert testimony on the conclusions drawn from the evidence (Smith, 2003). The judge 
had inadvertently set a precedent that all fingerprint evidence ever argued by expert 
witnesses using the same methodology was now inadmissible. Consequently two months 
later the judge came back with a reversed ruling where he admitted he had made a 
mistake and after further review the science was valid and the testimony would be 
allowed. This case nearly had devastating effects to the criminal justice system. Without 
a certified standard a similar ruling maybe made towards computer forensics. 
  Greater efforts need to be made for classification and testing of tools. The work 
done by the CFTT is good, but it is not enough. Too often investigators must rely on 
vender data to explain why tools act the way they do. Vendors often find many problems 
with a system or errors in code. How these errors affect the results from using the tool 
maybe unknown and great effort needs to be made in testing tools to find out error rates 
before patches and updates are released. Imagine the situation where computer evidence 
is collected and the case is put on hold for several months. During that time period the     Marsico 17 
vendor whose tool was used to collect the evidence comes out with a newer version or a 
patch for the current version. This patch, they boldly advertise, fixes know issues with the 
previous version. Is the evidence that was collected using the version that has “known 
issues” now inadmissible? Only the judge will be able to decide this matter, but it 
illustrates a reason why the evidence collected could be flawed and raises significant 
doubts on its quality. With proper error testing before and after a patch or new version is 
released, confidence in evidence that was collected using any version can be maintained. 
  The next step in the peer review process is providing the journals with certified 
experts to review the research of the community. How will experts be established? In a 
field as large as computers it is difficult for one to be an expert in all areas; one who may 
be good in programming may have little knowledge in risk assessment. An accreditation 
or certification of an expert needs to be developed that would allow the court to trust ones 
background and ascertain that they have the required knowledge to be considered a 
person who has expertise in the science and technology of computer forensics. First steps 
have been taken by universities and other institutions to develop programs to train 
individuals in computer forensics.  
With a standard methodology resources can be focused on research and 
development of new ideas. Those with the most training, knowledge, experience and 
certification can in turn be considered experts and recognized by the judicial system to 
provide accurate testimony based on the knowledge accepted and standardized by the 
scientific community.      Marsico 18 
It really is Elementary 
 
These ideas are large steps for the computer forensic community. For something 
that will have drastic effects on how the world operates it is difficulty to understand why 
theses steps have not already been taken. A lack of funding in this area is a poor excuse 
for lack of progress. In a society where more then 70% of information never makes it to 
paper, computer forensics should be a top priority for progress (R. Hendricks, personal 
interview, March 3, 2004). These challenges need to be faced head on and approached 
from the top down with those in power gathering together the right information to make 
the decisions that have to be made. Until the first steps of unification and development 
are made, the community will continue in a state of limbo. The courts will not be able to 
rely on the evidence collected and criminals may go free, or worse yet the innocent may 
be incarcerated. The understanding being gained by the community is less useful if it is 
not considered a good science.  
A vial step in the maturation process is acceptance and validation. This right of 
passage must be undertaken for it will not come to one on its own. Until the modern 
community of computer forensics is willing to undertake the vital steps for acceptance, 
the United States Judicial system, an institution that has been in place for over 220 years, 
will be unable to constitute the science that the community practices as valid and will 
refer to this juvenile art as “junk science.” As a “junk science” Mr. Holmes would have 
no choose but to pack up and move on to the next case, knowing full well that his 
“smoking gun” of computer evidence would not be admissible at trial. Those who 
practice the computer forensics of today must take on the challenge of proving to their 
own Doctor Watson that computer forensic science is elementary.     Marsico 19 
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